Release A CDR RID Report

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RID ID   CDR 54
Review
Originator Ref
Priority 2

Section PF   **Page** 12   **Figure Table**

Category Name External Interfaces   **Actionee**   ECS

Sub Category

Subject   Security

Description of Problem or Suggestion:

Prevent unauthorized IP traffic onto ECS processors. For example, How would you prevent Internet originated datagrams from being forwarded locally in ethernet broadcast/multicast address frames?
Also: it can happen the other way, which may cause some form of disclosure.

Originator's Recommendation

The ECS Security Architecture did not address the potential of a security incident relating to message routing controls to prevent unauthorized IP traffic onto ECS processors.

GSFC Response by: **GSFC Response Date**

HAIS Response by: D. Moore   **HAIS Schedule**   9/13/95

HAIS R. E.   D. Moore   **HAIS Response Date**   10/20/95

ECS will prevent unauthorized traffic onto ECS processors and networks via the use of IP and TCP layer filters in the FDDI switch/router. The details of the network security plan are outlined in section 5.2.5 of the "Overview of R-A SDPS/CSMS System Design."

To answer the example given, the FDDI switch will operate on the IP (network) layer and will route packets based on IP address. Ethernet or FDDI broadcasts/multicasts are MAC-layer entities and therefore would not be forwarded by the FDDI switch. Thus, there is no way for broadcast/multicast traffic to be either forwarded into or out of the ECS DAACs.

Status   **Closed**   **Date Closed**   **12/12/95**   **Sponsor**   **Herring**

******   **Attachment if any**   ******